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NOTES
DOE AND DRONENBURG: SODOMY STATUTES ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL
In 1976 the United States Supreme Court in Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney for Richmond1 summarily affirmed a three judge
district court's dismissal of a challenge to the Virginia sodomy
statute. In Doe, anonymous homosexuals contended that the stat-
ute impinged on their constitutional rights to due process, privacy,
and expression.2 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia rejected those arguments, finding that the right
to privacy extended only to marriage, family, and procreation. Be-
cause the district court reasoned that homosexuality had no con-
nection to those traditional privacy interests, it held that the con-
stitutional right to privacy did not extend to consensual
homosexual activities.3
More recently, in Dronenburg v. Zech,4 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected a homosex-
ual's contention that an administrative discharge from the United
States Navy for homosexual conduct impinged on his rights to pri-
vacy and equal protection. Citing Doe and Poe v. Ullman,' the
court held that the rights to privacy and equal protection do not
protect homosexual conduct even though that conduct occurs in
private.
Since Doe, several federal courts either ignored or rejected Doe
as a summary affirmance and extended the scope of constitution-
ally protected privacy to protect consensual homosexual relations.'
1. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
2. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
3. Id. at 1202.
4. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
5. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
6. Id. at 20.
7. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985); Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982). Contra Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
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Additionally, several state courts used federal or state equal pro-
tection and privacy doctrines to strike down state sodomy
statutes.'
The underlying issue of the topic discussed in this Note is the
allocation of government power in areas not addressed textually by
the Constitution. Stated differently, can a court of a particular sov-
ereign constitutionally invalidate a clear expression of that sover-
eign's representative unit without express constitutional support?
Because sodomy statutes provide a good example of modern statu-
tory criminal law well supported by common law history9 and
because the Constitution does not address sodomy or sexual pref-
erence expressly, this Note examines whether a court constitution-
ally can invalidate a state prohibition of sodomy. To resolve these
issues, the Note first reviews the background of and reasons for
sodomy statutes. The Virginia sodomy statute serves as an exam-
ple of modern sodomy statutes, and Doe is discussed in relation to
that statute. The Note then tests the validity of Doe, Dronenburg,
and the statute by analyzing the recent challenges to state sodomy
statutes.
This Note contends that legislatures should decide whether to
decriminalize sodomy; the judiciary should not make the decision
through substantive due process.10 Although arguing that all sod-
omy should be subject to criminalization, this Note reaches three
specific conclusions.11 First, current case law prohibits criminaliza-
8. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); People v. Onofre, 51
N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980). Contra State v. Poe, 40 N.C.
App. 385, 252 S.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 303, 259 S.E.2d 304 (1979), appeal dis-
missed, 445 U.S. 947 (1980); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980).
9. See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
10. This Note only briefly addresses bestiality and sodomy with children. States may con-
tinue to prohibit bestiality on the basis of the state interest in the protection of animals.
See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 18.2-393 to -403 (1982). Further, the traditional moral aversion to
sodomy still applies fully to bestiality.
States prohibit sodomy between adults and children on the ground that a child cannot
give informed consent. The state interest in protecting children allows criminalization of
this form of sodomy. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
11. This Note does not address forcible or public sodomy because even the broadest con-
stitutional interpretations do not protect these forms of conduct. E.g., Baker v. Wade, 553
F. Supp. 1121, 1147 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973),
aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d
476, 491, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
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tion of marital sodomy. Second, the courts are divided on the issue
of nonmarital sodomy. Third, legislatures constitutionally may
prohibit homosexual sodomy but first should weigh a number of
factors before making the decision.
THE MODERN SODOMY STATUTE
In general, sodomy is the unnatural carnal knowledge of human
beings with each other or with a beast.' 2 More specific definitions
appear in state sodomy statutes, of which Virginia's is typical:
§ 18.2-361. Crimes against nature.-If any person shall carnally
know in any manner any brute animal, or carnally know any
male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or
voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be
guilty of a Class 6 felony;"3 ....
This statute prohibits several types of conduct. First, the statute
prohibits any carnal knowledge of a brute animal, or bestiality. 4
Sodomy statutes generally define carnal knowledge as the knowl-
edge of the body, passions, or sexual appetites of either another
person or an animal. 15 Thus, the Virginia statute forbids any sex-
ual contact between a person and any animal, including oral or
genital copulation. 16 The statute also prohibits any sexual contact
between male or female persons by the anus or by oral-genital con-
tact." Any coupling or sexual contact by the genitals with the
(1981); see also Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969).
12. State v. Young, 140 Or. 228, -, 13 P.2d 604, 607 (1932). The common law defined
"sodomy" as a "crime against nature" between humans and "buggery" as a "crime against
nature" between a man and a beast. The terms sodomy and buggery now are used inter-
changeably. Wise v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 757, 760, 45 S.E. 508, 509 (1923).
13. VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1982). A class 6 felony has an authorized punishment of impris-
onment from one to five years or, within the discretion of the fact finder, imprisonment of
not greater than one year and a $1000 fine, or both. VA. CODE § 18.2-10 (1982).
14. Bestiality is a sexual connection between a human and a "beast" of the opposite sex.
State v. Poole, 59 Ariz. 44, 122 P.2d 415 (1942). Sodomy statutes define a beast as any
animal other than a human. See Murray v. State, 236 Ind. 688, 143 N.E.2d 290 (1957) (in-
tercourse with a chicken is intercourse with a beast even thought the chicken is not a mam-
mal); see also Hudspeth v. State, 194 Ark. 576, 108 S.W.2d 1085 (1937) (intercourse with a
cow violated the Arkansas sodomy statute).
15. 81 C.J.S. Sodomy § 2(a), at 646 (1983).
16. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 307 (1812).
17. VA. CODE § 18.2-361.
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mouth or anus of another person,' s including fellatio,' 9 cunnilin-
gus,20 and anilingus is prohibited.2' Consequently, penile-vaginal
intercourse is the only permissible sexual activity under the Vir-
ginia statute. Finally, any person who consents to any of the pro-
hibited sex acts also is guilty of sodomy. 22
Four situations potentially could be prosecuted under statutes
like Virginia's: first, bestiality; second, consensual sodomy between
married persons; third, consensual sodomy between unmarried
heterosexuals; and fourth, consensual sodomy between homosexu-
als. 23 This Note analyzes the latter three classes 24 and concludes
that all should be subject to prohibition by the states.
History of Sodomy Statutes
Sodomy laws have existed in western civilization at least since
biblical times.2 5 The term "sodomy" comes from the ancient city of
Sodom,26 which, according to the Bible, God destroyed because of
its citizens' evil practices. 27 Sodomy prohibitions appeared in Ju-
daic law as part of a regulatory scheme designed to guide the He-
brew people in all aspects of life.2s During the middle ages, sodomy
18. In order to effect the prohibited coupling or sexual contact, penetration is required
(called "res in re"). Wise v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 757, 115 S.E. 508 (1923). Only slight
penetration is necessary and ejaculation is not required. See Ryan v. Commonwealth, 219
Va. 439, 247 S.E.2d 698 (1978); Ashby v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 443, 158 S.E.2d 657
(1968); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 307, 308 (1812).
19. Fellatio is an offense committed with the male sex organ and the mouth. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 743 (4th ed. 1968).
20. Cunnilingus is an offense committed with the female sex organ and the mouth.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 343 (5th ed. 1979).
21. Anilingus is "erotic stimulation achieved by contact between the mouth and the
anus." WEIISTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 85 (Unabridged 3d ed. 1969).
22. VA. CODE § 18.2-361.
23. See generally 2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2, at 363-65 (1980) (discussing the different
state rationales for enforcement regarding married couples, nonmarried heterosexual
couples, and homosexual couples).
24. This Note does not discuss bestiality because no one has challenged state power to
prohibit bestiality recently.
25. See Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alaska 1969).
26. Id.
27. Genesis 19:1-29.
28. Judaic law specifically prohibited homosexual sodomy. Leviticus 18:22. As examples
of the overall scheme of Judaic law, the following sex acts also were prohibited: adultery,
Leviticus 18:20; bestiality/buggery, Leviticus 18:23; incest, Leviticus 18:6-16 and sex with
any woman during menstruation, Leviticus 18:19.
648 [Vol. 26:645
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was a religious offense punished by the ecclesiastic courts. 29 In
England, sodomy was not an offense at common law but became
punishable in the temporal courts by the statute of Henry VIII.30
The statute was repealed during the reign of Queen Mary31 but
was reinstated upon the ascension of Elizabeth 1.32
These English statutes influenced early American law. The first
laws of the Jamestown colony incorporated the English prohibition
of sodomy.3 4 The colonists enacted this law to prevent persons
from succumbing to the "weakness of the[ir] bod[ies] .'35 The pre-
sent Virginia statute is directly traceable to a statute enacted in
1792.36 The statute has no recorded legislative history because the
Biblical law carried heavy penalties for these crimes: adultery - death, Leviticus 20:10;
homosexuality - death, Leviticus 20:13; bestiality/buggery - death for both person and the
animal, Leviticus 20:15-16; incest - death/exile, Leviticus 20:11, 12, 17.
29. Harris, 457 P.2d at 468.
30. Id. at 469 (citing 25 Henry VIII, c. 6 (1533)). The statute reads in part:
Forasmuch as there is not yet sufficient and condign punishment appointed
and limited by the due course of the laws of this realm, for the detestable and
abominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast- (2) it may
therefore please the King's highness, with the assent of his lords spiritual and
temporal, and the commons of this present parliament assembled, that it may
be enacted by authority of the same that the same offense be from henceforth
adjudged felony, and such order and form of process therein to be used against
the offenders as in cases of felony at the common law; ....
Id.
31. Id. at 649 n.42 (citing 1 Mary, c. 1 (1553)).
32. Id. (citing Elizabeth I, 5 Eliz., c. 17 (1562)).
33. Id. at 649.
34. FOR THE COLONY IN VIRGINIA BRITANNIA: LAWS DmvE, MORALL AND MARTIAL, ETC., art.
9, at 12 (London 1612) (compiled by W. Strachery, 1969) ("No man shall commit the horri-
ble, and detestable sins of Sodomie upon pain of death; .... ).
35. I have found either the necessity of the present State of the Colonie to re-
quire, or the infancie, and weakness of the body thereof, as yet able to digest,
and doe now publish [these laws] to all persons in the Colonie, that they may
as well take knowledge of the laws ....
Id. at 9-10.
36. 1 S. SHEPARD, THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, 1792 TO 1806, at 113 (1970) (re-
printed from 1835 ed., Richmond). The Virginia legislature passed the statute on December
10, 1792, which reads as follows:
Be it enacted and declared by the General Assembly, That if any do commit
the detestible and abominable vice of buggery, with man or beast, he or she so
offending, shall be adjudged a felon, and shall suffer death, as in case of felony,
without benefit of clergy.
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lawmakers considered the crime too disgusting to debate."
Sodomy statutes exist in America today for several reasons.
Many Americans believe that sodomy is wrong because it leads to
moral delinquency.38 States therefore enact sodomy statutes to
promote morality.3 9 Virginia, for instance, acted within its police
power in enacting its sodomy statute; the statute appears in the
Virginia Code chapter entitled "Crimes involving morals and de-
cency."40 Preserving health has been another reason for prohibiting
sodomy.4' States have contended, for instance, that prohibiting
sodomy inhibits the spread of venereal diseases.
Courts have long recognized state authority to legislate against
sodomy to protect morals or health.42 Protecting morality and
37. See J. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 133 (1838). The common law treated sod-
omy or buggery as a crime not fit to be named. See generally J. MATTHE:WS, DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA OF A CRIMINAL NATURE 124-25 (2d ed. 1878). The unwillingness of legisla-
tors and judges to discuss factual situations in sodomy cases inhibits legal research in the
field. See Harris, 457 P.2d at 642.
38. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va.
1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
39. Id.
40. VA. CODE ch. 8, at 418 (1982).
41. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1141-42 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (discussing the
health element in general police power argument). As of November 26, 1984, there were
6,993 reported cases of Acquired Immune Deficiency syndrome (AIDS), a disease with a
mortality rate exceeding 48%. Seventy-three percent of patients diagnosed before January
1983 have died. Over 72% of the victims have been male homosexuals, especially those with
multiple sexual partners. The two primary methods of communication apparently are sexual
relations with an infected person and blood transfusions from those persons. 33 CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MORBIDITY AND MORTAL-
rry WEEKLY REPORT (MMWR), Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) -
United States, No. 47 (Nov. 30, 1984).
Assume that all of the states had sodomy statutes and that those statutes were enforced
strictly. Assume further that all blood donations were screened effectively for the AIDS
virus. Under such a model, the AIDS virus would be contained.
Problems arise, however, as one moves away from the model. Not all states have sodomy
statutes. For the states that do have sodomy statutes, enforcement is difficult and expensive.
Despite these practical problems, any inhibition of homosexual sodomy will lessen the inci-
dence of AIDS.
As the incidence of AIDS increases in the homosexual community and as bisexual mem-
bers of that community carry the disease to the population at large, the enforcement of
sodomy statutes may become a primary alternative in the containment of this disease.
42. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225,
500 S.W.2d 368, 372 (1983), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1984); State v. Rhinehart, 70 Wash.
2d 649, -, 424 P.2d 906, 909, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967).
Writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
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health is at the core of the police power"3 because government is no
more than public order and the erosion of morality weakens that
public order." This exercise of power is proper, however, only if
the matter sought to be regulated actually affects public morals"
'
and is not protected by the constitution.46 Holding the protection
of morals to be within the police power recognizes that the states,
not the federal courts, should set standards of morality.
Presently, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia im-
pose criminal sanctions for some form of consensual sodomy;47 four
Dronenburg, Judge Bork stated:
[The] theory that majority morality and majority choice is always made pre-
sumptively invalid by the Constitution attacks the very predicate of demo-
cratic government. When the Constitution does not speak to the contrary, the
choices of those put in authority by the electoral process, or those who are
accountable to such persons, come before us not as supect because
majoritarian, but as conclusively valid for that very reason.
741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
43. The Court in Berman emphasized that the scope of the police power in elastic and is
determined on the facts of each case. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, however,
when the legislature speaks, the public interest is declared in conclusive terms. In such cases
the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs that are served by
social legislation.
"Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of
the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power." Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
44. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
45. Eccles v. Stone, 134 Fla. 113, 183 So. 628 (1938).
46. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
47. The following states prohibit various forms of private consensual sodomy. Those ap-
plying a modern definition exclude the conduct of married couples. ALABAMA, ALA. CODE
§ 13A-6-64 to -65 (1982) (modern definition); ARIZONA, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411,
13-1412 (1978 & Supp. 1983-1984) (common law definition; "infamous crime against na-
ture"); ARKANSAS, ARu STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977) (modern definition; homosexual acts
only); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (Michie 1981) (modern defi-
nition); FLORIDA, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.2 (West 1976) ("unnatural and lascivious act")
(upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973));
IDAHO, IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979) (common law definition); KANSAS, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3505 (West Supp. 1984) (modern definition); KENTUCKY, Ky. REv. STAT. § 510.100
(1975) (modern definition, homosexuals only); LOUISIANA, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:89
(West 1974 & Supp. 1984) (modern definition); MARYLAND, MD. ANN. CODE §§ 27-553,
27-554 (Michie 1982) ("sodomy" and "unnatural and perverted sex practices"); MASSA-
CHUSETTS, MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 272, §§ 34, 35 (West 1970) (common law definition);
MICHIGAN, MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 750.158, 750.338, 750.338a, 750.338b (1968) (common
law definition), MINNESOTA, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 - 609.294 (West Supp. 1984)
(modern definition); MISSISSIPPI, Miss. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-59 (1973) (common law defi-
nition); MISSOURI, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979) (modern definition); MON-
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states have had their sodomy statutes invalidated; 8 the other
twenty-two states have decriminalized consensual sodomy. 49 These
sodomy statutes do not prohibit homosexuality.50 Rather, they
merely prohibit certain types of deviant sexual conduct.
TANA, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1984) (deviate sexual conduct); NEVADA, NEV. REV.
STAT. § 201.190 (1979) (homosexual acts only); NORTH CAROLINA, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-
177 (1981) (common law definition); OKLAHOMA, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West
1983) (common law definition); RHODE ISLAND, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981) (common
law definition); SOUTH CAROLINA, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1977)
("abominable crime of buggery"); TENNESSEE, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982) (com-
mon law definition); UTAH, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403, -406 (1978 & Supp. 1983) (modern
definition); VIRGINIA, VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1982) (modern definition); WISCONSIN, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983-1984) (modern definition).
48. The following state sodomy statutes have been declared invalid by the indicated
court: GEORGIA, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982)(declared unconstitutional by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202
(11th Cir. 1985)); NEW YORK, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.00, 130.38 (McKinney 1975) (crimi-
nal statute invalidated by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d
476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981)); PENN-
SYLVANIA, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1301, 1324 (1973) (criminal statutes invalidated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980));
TEXAS, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974) (held unconstitutional by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982)).
49. The following states have decriminalized private, consensual sodomy between adult
homosexuals: ALASKA, 1978 ALASKA SESS. LAWS, ch. 166 (effective Jan. 1, 1980); CALI-
FORNIA, 1975 CAL. STAT., ch. 71, § 7 (effective July 1, 1976); COLORADO, 1971 COLO.
SEss. LAWS, ch. 121, § 1 (approved June 2, 1971); CONNECTICUT, 1969 CONN. PUB. ACTS
828, § 214 (effective Oct. 1, 1971); DELAWARE, 58 DEL. LAWS, ch. 497, § 1 (effective Apr. 1,
1973); HAWAII, 1972 HAWAII SESS. LAWS, act 9, § 1 (effective Jan. 1, 1983); ILLINOIS, 1961
ILL. LAWS, pt. 1983, § 11-2 (effective Jan. 1, 1962); INDIANA, 1976 IND. ACTS. P.L. 148, § 24
(effective July 1, 1977); IOWA, IOWA AcTs, ch. 1245, § 520 (effective Jan. 1, 1978); MAINE,
1975 ME. AcTs, ch. 499, § 5 (effective Mar. 1, 1976); NEBRASKA, 1977 NEB. LAWS, L.B. 38,
§ 328 (effective July 1, 1978); NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1973 N.H. LAWS, 532: 26, (effective Nov.
1, 1973); NEW JERSEY, 1978 N.J. LAWS, ch. 95, § 2C:98-2 (effective Sept. 1, 1979); NEW
MEXICO, 1975 N.M. LAWS, ch. 109, § 8; NORTH DAKOTA, 1977 N.D. SEss. LAWS, ch. 122,
§ 1 (approved Mar. 19, 1977); OHIO, 1972 OHIO LAWS, 134 v H 511, § 2 (effective Jan. 1,
1974); OREGON, 1971 OR. LAWS, ch. 743, § 432 (167.040) (effective Jan. 1, 1972); SOUTH
DAKOTA, 1976 S.D. SESs. LAWS, ch. 158, § 22-8 (effective Apr. 1, 1977); VERMONT, 1977
VT. AcTS, No. 51, § 3 (effective July 1, 1977); WASHINGTON, 1975 WASH. LAWS, 1st exec.
Sess., ch. 260 (effective July 1, 1976); WEST VIRGINIA, 1976 W. VA. ACTs, ch. 43 (effective
June 11, 1976); WYOMING, 1977 WYo. SESs. LAWS, ch. 70, § 3 (effective May 27, 1977).
50. See Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 107, 1076 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); see also Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City v. National Gay
Task Force, 53 U.S.L.W. 4408 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1985)(per curiam)(judgment affirmed by an
equally divided court).
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Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond
In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,"' anony-
mous male plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's
sodomy statute. They alleged that, as applied to their active and
regular homosexual relations, the statute violated their fifth and
fourteenth amendment assurances of due process, their first
amendment guarantee of freedom of expression, and their first and
ninth amendment freedom of privacy.51 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the plaintiffs'
claim and found the statute constitutional.53 The United States
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision. 4
The plaintiffs based their privacy argument largely on Griswold
v. Connecticut55 and its progeny. In Griswold the United States
Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut statute that prohibited
the use of contraceptives by married couples.56 The Court in Gris-
wold held that the use of contraceptives was protected by a right
of marital privacy that surrounded the home and the family.57 The
majority in Doe noted that Griswold distinguished forbidden ex-
tramarital sexuality, such as adultery and homosexuality, from
marital sexuality.58 Therefore, Griswold did not invalidate state
51. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
52. The challenged statute was the 1950 predecessor to the current Virginia statute.
VA. CODE § 18.1-212: Crimes against nature.-If any person shall carnally
know in any manner any brute animal, or carnally know any male or female
person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such
carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in
the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than three years.
403 F. Supp. at 1200 (quoting VA. CODE § 18.2-212 (1950)).
53. Id. at 1203.
54. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The Supreme Court affirmed the majority decision summarily,
without hearing arguments or writing an opinion. Summary affirmance typically is given to
Cases that the Court thinks do not raise "substantial" constitutional questions. T. GREY, THE
LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MoRnrrY 67 (1983). In 1973 the Supreme Court gave implicit sup-
port to sodomy statutes when it upheld Florida's sodomy statute against vagueness and
retroactivity attacks. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
55. 81 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. Id. at 485.
57. Id. at 485-86.
58. 403 F. Supp. at 1201. In Griswold, Justice Goldberg emphasized that "the Court's
holding today ... in no way interferes with a state's proper regulation of sexual promiscu-
ity or misconduct. . . . 'Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which
the state [properly may] forbid' . . . ."
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
regulation of certain forbidden sexual acts. It required only that
the decision whether to use contraceptives be left to the married
couple. 9
The Doe opinion further noted that the Court has recognized
adultery, homosexuality, fornication, and incest as not being im-
mune from criminal inquiry, even if privately practiced."0 In 1961
the Supreme Court in Poe v. Ullmans' upheld the same Connecti-
cut statute that it later rejected in Griswold. Dissenting in Poe,
Justice Harlan declared that the right to privacy should embrace
the decision between married persons whether to use contracep-
tives, but that
I would not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication
and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately
practiced. So much has been explicitly recognized in acknowl-
edging the State's rightful concern for its people's moral welfare
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies
which the State forbids altogether ....
[Regulating the intimacy of husband and wife] is surely a dif-
ferent thing indeed from punishing those which establish inti-
macies which the law has always forbidden and which can have
no claim to social protection. 2
The district court in Doe found that homosexual sodomy had no
connection to the protected interests of family, marriage, and pro-
creation on which the holding of Griswold rested.6 3 For that rea-
son, it held homosexual sodomy not protected by the right to
privacy. 4
381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553
(Harlan J., dissenting) (1961)).
59. A substantial body of case law has developed that prohibits the application of sodomy
statutes to married couples. Several courts have extended the Griswold right of marital pri-
vacy to protect marital sodomy despite Justice Goldberg's concurrence. See, e.g., Lovisi v.
Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d
873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
60. 403 F. Supp. at 1202. (quoting Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 552-53 (1961)).
61. 367 U.S. 497.
62. Id. at 552-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).




The court next applied rational basis scrutiny to the sodomy
statute, finding that the legitimate state interest in the promotion
of morals and decency was supported rationally by the effort to
prohibit those specific types of indecent acts. 5 The court reasoned
that the state's concern that private sodomy was likely to lead to
moral delinquency was a sufficient evil to justify the statute.66
Judge Merhige dissented. 7 He believed that the Supreme Court
privacy decisions created a fundamental right to privacy regarding
all aspects of sexual activity, including the choice of consensual
sodomy partners.6 "
Doe as a Summary Affirmance
Because the court summarily affirmed the district court decision,
Doe's precedential value is unclear. In Hicks v. Miranda,69 the Su-
preme Court stated that the lower courts are bound by its sum-
mary decisions until the Court informs them otherwise. In 1977 the
Court softened the weight of summary affirmances, saying that the
Court adopts only the decision, not the judgment or reasoning, of a
lower court in a summary affirmance. 0 In 1979 the Court further
defined the issue, stating that summary dispositions were confined
to the exact facts of a case and to the precise question posed in the
jurisdictional statement.71 Summary affirmances in short, merely
leave undisturbed the lower court judgment and prevent lower
courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues
and facts presented and decided by that action.
Despite these limitations, however, a summary disposition is
binding precedent and is a decision on the merits.7 2 In Doe the
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1203-05 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1204. Recently, in Doe v. Duling, 53 U.S.L.W. 2459-60 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 1985),
Judge Merhige held the Virginia Fornication Statute (VA. CODE § 18.2-344 (1982)) and the
Virginia Lewd and Lascivious Cohabitation Statute (VA. CODE § 18.2-345 (1982)) unconsti-
tutional on the ground that the Constitution provides an absolute right to engage in hetero-
sexual intercourse.
69. 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
70. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
71. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1979).
72. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1213-14 (Kravitch, J., dissenting); Lecates v. Justice of Peace
Court No. 4, 637 F.2d 898 (3rd Cir. 1980). See generally, Annot., 45 L ED. 2D 791 (1976 &
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question was whether the Virginia sodomy statute violated due
process, freedom of expression, or privacy rights. The district court
held that the statute did not violate those rights and that the stat-
ute was constitutional. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed
that decision. Doe is dispositive, therefore, on due process, privacy,
and freedom of expression attacks against a statute that prohibits
consensual homosexual sodomy.73 Problems arise because some
courts refuse to follow Doe.
Dronenburg v. Zech
In January 1981, James L. Dronenburg was administratively dis-
charged from the United States Navy for misconduct relating to
homosexual acts.74 Dronenburg challenged the discharge in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, but the
district court granted summary judgment for the Navy.7 5
Dronenburg then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, contending that the discharge im-
pinged on his constitutional rights to privacy and equal
protection.7 6
The court first rejected Dronenburg's right to privacy argument.
It emphasized that, because of the Supreme Court's summary af-
firmance, Doe was binding on the lower courts. 7 The Navy regula-
tion, therefore, clearly was constitutional.7 8 The court also engaged
in an independent analysis of Griswold and its progeny, concluding
that the right to privacy did not protect homosexual conduct.7 9
Turning to equal protection, the court found no fundamental right
to engage in homosexual conduct s0 and assumed that homosexuals
did not constitute a suspect classification. The regulation, there-
Supp. 1984).
73. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1213-16 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
74. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a contested discussion
of the issues, see the denial of rehearing, 746 F.2d at 1579.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1391-92.
78. Id. at 1392. The Court stated: "If a statute proscribing a homosexual conduct in a
civilian context is sustainable, then such a regulation is certainly sustainable in a military
context." Id.
79. Id. at 1392-96.
80. Id. at 1396.
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fore, was not subject to strict scrutiny. Under rational basis scru-
tiny, the military interest in the maintenance of discipline, good
order, and morale was infringed sufficiently by homosexual rela-
tions between Dronenburg, a 27 year old instructor, and his stu-
dent, a 19 year old seaman recruit, to justify Dronenburg's dis-
charge from the service."
THE CURRENT ATTACKS
In Hardwick v. Bowers,82 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held the Georgia Sodomy statute8 unconsti-
tutional because the statute violated a fundamental right to quin-
tessential privacy and intimate association. 4 In Baker v. Wades5
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
held the Texas Homosexual Conduct Statute86 unconstitutional
because the statute violated both the fundamental right to privacy
and the right to equal protection.8 7 The New York Court of Ap-
peals in People v. Onofre8 s reversed the conviction of a male defen-
dant who had engaged in consensual deviate sexual intercourse
81. Id. at 1398. The military prohibition of homosexual conduct was approved in an ear-
lier Supreme Court case, but the analysis rested primarily on the unique needs of the mili-
tary service in promoting good order and discipline. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743
(1974); see also Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1980). The constitutional analysis in Dronenburg does not depend on military necessity
argument.
82. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
83. (a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by impris-
onment for not less than one nor more than 20 years....
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
84. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212-13.
85. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
86. A person commits an offense if he [or she] engages in deviate sexual inter-
course with another individual of the same sex.
Deviate sexual intercourse means any contact between any part of the geni-
tals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.
A violation of the Statute is a Class C misdemeanor, punishable only by a
fine not to exceed $200.
Id. at 1124 (quoting TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974)).
87. Id. at 1134-45.
88. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
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with a seventeen-year-old boy in his home, holding that the New
York consensual sodomy statute 9 violated his rights to privacy
and equal protection."0 In Commonwealth v. Bonadio,91 female de-
fendants were arrested at a pornographic theater and charged with
violating the Pennsylvania Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse
Statute92 by engaging in sex with male patrons onstage for the
viewing pleasure of the other patrons.93 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the statute exceeded the valid bounds of
the police power and impinged on the constitutional right to equal
protection. 4 The court ruled that the states could not use their
police power to enforce a majority morality on persons whose con-
duct did not harm others.9 5
89. Id. at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49. The applicable statute
provided:
Consensual sodomy
A person is guilty of consensual sodomy when he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another person.
Sex offenses; definitions of terms.
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
2. Deviate sexual intercourse means sexual contact between persons not mar-
ried to each other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the
mouth and the penis, or the mouth and the vulva.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.00, 130.38 (McKinney 1975).
90. Id. at 494, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
91. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
92. Id. at 93-94, 415 A.2d at 48-49. The relevant portions of the statute stated: "A person
who engages in deviate sexual intercourse under circumstances not covered by section 3123
of this title [related to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse] is guilty of a misdemeanor of
the second degree." Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, 1, 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3124 (1973).
The statute defined deviate sexual intercourse as: "Sexual intercourse per os [by the
mouth] or per anus between human beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of
sexual intercourse with an animal." Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334 1, 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3101 (1973).
93. 490 Pa. at 100, 415 A.2d at 52 (Nix, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51-52.
95. The court quoted John Stuart Mill:
[The] sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protec-
tion. . . . [Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of
1985] SODOMY STATUTES 659
These four cases are typical of the privacy and equal protection
attacks on statutes regulating sexual behavior. The Note now ana-
lyzes these attacks in light of Doe and its progeny. This analysis is
conducted within the marital, nonmarital, and homosexual frame-
work outlined above. These distinctions are necessary because the
case law and the relative strengths of the state and personal inter-
ests vary with each situation.
THE PRIVACY ANALYSIS
The Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court has recognized that a right of personal pri-
vacy exists under the Constitution. 6 This right is not delineated
textually, but is rooted in the "penumbra" of other constitutional
provisions.97 These roots reach from the first amendment,98 the
others, to do [so] would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or en-
treating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case
he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter
him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.
490 Pa. at 95-96, 415 A.2d at 50 (quoting J. ML, ON LmERTY (1859)).
Hardwick, Baker, and the state cases indicate a judicial momentum for the decriminaliza-
tion of consensual adult sodomy. Contra Dronenburg v. Zech, 714 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.
1984). Another example of this momentum is a recent series of federal immigration cases
holding that homosexuals cannot be excluded from the United States simply because they
are homosexual. See Hill v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.
1983); Nemetz v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981); Les-
bian/Gay Freedom Day Committee, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 541 F.
Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2668 (1984). But see In re Longstaff, 716
F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2668 (1984) (prohibiting naturalization of
a homosexual who withheld information of his sexual preference).
The decisions primarily were based on interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). In the Act, Congress treated homosexuals as
psychopathic personalities or sexual deviates that could be prevented from entering the
country. See Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967). Today
the medical profession no longer considers homosexuals to be psychopathic personalities or
sexual deviates. Some courts have reasoned, therefore, that Congress no longer intends to
exclude homosexuals. Hill v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.
1983).
96. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
97. Id.
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fourth and fifth amendments, 9 the ninth amendment,100 and the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.10
Only personal rights that are "fundamental" or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" are included in the guarantee of per-
sonal privacy. 02 A problem exists, however, in determining which
personal privacy rights are "fundamental" or "within the concept
of ordered liberty."
Creation of the Right to Privacy: Modern Lochnerization
The threshold question concerning privacy is whether the Su-
preme Court legitimately can create substantive due process rights
that are not enumerated specifically in the Constitution. The pro-
cess of implying constitutional rights from other, specifically enu-
merated rights is termed "Lochnerization" after Lochner v. New
York. 103 In Lochner, the Court used the fourteenth amendment to
create a constitutional "right to contract." The Court then used
the right to contract to strike down a New York labor law limiting
women's work in bakeries to no more than sixty hours per week. 04
The practical effect of the decision was to replace the opinion of
the people of New York as expressed through their legislature with
the opinion of the Court in an area of economic theory. In his fa-
mous dissent in Lochner, Justice Holmes questioned whether the
Court could or should impose its opinion over the desires of the
people 10 5 and concluded that it should not. 00
98. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
99. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
350 (1967); and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
100. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1975) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
101. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
102. Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
103. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 75. A portion of Mr. Justice Holmes's dissent follows:
The case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the coun-
try does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agree with that theory, I
should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do
not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement
or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state consti-
tutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislatures
660 [Vol. 26:645
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The spirit of Justice Holmes' dissent prevailed nearly thirty
years later in Nebbia v. New York. 0 7 In deciding that the state
had the power to fix retail prices for milk, the Court rejected the
idea of judicial creation of rights not supported expressly by the
Constitution's text. It held that "the guaranty of due process...
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and sub-
stantial relation to the object sought to be obtained."108 Reasoning
that no exercise of a private right could be imagined that would
not affect the public in some way, the Court stated that, in the
absence of textual constitutional restrictions, a state must be free
to select the economic policy that it deems to promote the public
welfare.109 Later decisions continued this theme of judicial defer-
ence to state legislatures on matters of economics.
In Williamson v. Lee Optical,110 the Court upheld an Oklahoma
statute that strictly regulated visual care. The Court stated that "it
is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a ra-
tional way to correct it." 1 The Court found the statute's over-
breadth to be irrelevant: "The Oklahoma law may exact a needless,
wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the legislature,
not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the
new requirement. . . .The day is gone when this Court uses the
might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and which
equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and usury
laws are ancient examples .... The liberty of a citizen to do as he likes so
long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which
has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school
laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his
money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not ....
... I think the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it
can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the stat-
ute... would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law.
198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 76.
107. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
108. Id. at 525.
109. Id. at 537.
110. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
111. Id. at 488.
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down
state laws. . . because they might be unwise, improvident, or out
of harmony with a particular school of thought.""' 2 The Court fur-
ther stated that the people must resort to the polls, not the courts,
for protection against legislative abuses."' To date, the Court has
refused to interfere with economic regulation that does not conflict
with enumerated constitutional rights." 4
Griswold v. Connecticut,"5 the first major privacy decision,"16 is
simply Lochner in another context. In Griswold, the Court created
a constitutional right to privacy, a nontextual right, to allow it to
impose its opinion regarding contraceptives on the people of Con-
necticut. To protect this nontextual right, the Court struck down a
Connecticut anticontraceptive statute as an impermissible in-
fringement of the right to marital privacy.1 7
112. Id. at 487-88.
113. Id. at 488.
114. See generally Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
115. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116. The Griswold decision can be portrayed as a logical extension of earlier case law. In
1923 the Supreme Court, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), reversed the conviction
of a German language teacher who was found in violation of a Nebraska law prohibiting the
teaching of foreign languages to young children. The Court viewed "liberty" in the four-
teenth amendment as going beyond freedom from bodily restraint to include the rights to
contract, to engage in the occupation of one's choice, to marry, to have and raise children,
and to worship God in the manner of one's choice. Id. at 399.
Two years later a unanimous Court overturned an Oregon law that required all children
to attend public school. The education and upbringing of children were to be left to parents,
and parents could choose private over public schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925). In 1942 the Supreme Court held that the sterilization of habitual criminals was
unconstitutional because the punishment impermissibly impinged on marriage and procrea-
tion. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In each of these cases, there was an increas-
ing awareness of the need to protect the individual's ability to have and to raise children.
Griswold merely reinforced this ability to choose not to have children. Therefore, limiting
Griswold to the choice whether to have children is reasonable; the line of cases preceding
Griswold does not suggest an intent to create a right to sexual nonconformity.
117. 381 U.S. at 485. The Connecticut anticontraceptive statute was being used to pre-
vent the Medical Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut from giving
contraceptive advice to married persons. Because no home was searched for contraceptives,
fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure was not infringed and
the Court was forced to resort to the creation of the right to privacy. The Court further
strengthened the sanctity of marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where it
invalidated Virginia's prohibition of interracial marriage. The Court ruled that antimis-
cegenation statutes impinge impermissably on the right to privacy in the marital decision.
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The Lochner constitutional right to contract is no less important
than the right to use contraceptives. Further, as many constitu-
tional penumbras support the right to contract as the right to pri-
vacy. The Court has chosen to allow the people, through their leg-
islatures, to determine hours of employment or the cost of milk.
Similarly, the Court should allow the people to decide whether
they will use contraceptives, have abortions, or tolerate sodomy.1"8
Economic theory is opinion and morality is social norm based on
majority opinion. Both involve broad social and policy questions
that are best left to the legislatures. Consequently, courts should
stop their interference in the field of morality for the same reasons
they stopped their interference with economics. 119
Until the "moral" Nebbia is decided, the right to privacy re-
mains the law. Uncertainty remains, however, concerning the lim-
its of that right. Because the right to privacy is not enumerated in
or necessarily implied from the Constitution, its legitimacy is ques-
tionable. The right to privacy, furthermore, has obvious natural
limitations and must be construed narrowly. Although a man's
home is his castle, he cannot commit murder there. Similarly, he
cannot gamble, smoke marijuana, or use other illegal drugs under
the protection of privacy. 120 These acts are not within the specific
groups of acts protected by the privacy case law. Consensual devi-
ant sex has no relation to family, home, or procreation and there-
fore should be treated as outside the realm of constitutional pri-
Id. at 12.
118. Writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Dronenburg, Judge Bork stated:
If the revolution in sexual mores . . . is in fact ever to arrive, ... it must
arrive through the moral choices of the people and their elected representa-
tives, not through the ukase of this court
741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
119. [A] judge has no means of demonstrating that his moral views about forms
of human [sexual] gratification are superior to the views of others. For that
reason, a judge has no warrant, where the Constitution is silent, to force his
morality upon a legislature that has made a different moral assessment.
Bork, Judge Bork replies, 1984 A.BA J. 132 (explaining his 1971 Indiana Law Journal arti-
cle; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IN. L.J. 1 (1971));
see also Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396-97.
120. See United States v. Horsley, 519 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
944 (1976); National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123
(D.D.C. 1980).
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vacy and subject to state regulation. 2'
Privacy Attacks by Heterosexuals
Whether the right to privacy protects consensual marital sod-
omy 122 is considered first because privacy attacks by married
couples on sodomy statutes have been the most successful in re-
cent years. On its facts, Griswold protects only the right of married
couples to use contraceptives. 12 Later interpretations of Griswold,
however, have expanded the right of privacy to protect individual
autonomy in all matters of childbearing. 24
Conversely, Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold pointed
out that the Court's holding did not restrict the state's regulation
of sexual misconduct. 25 Because of the suspect legitimacy of the
right to privacy,126 the narrow interpretations of that right in Jus-
tice Goldberg's concurrence and Doe are appropriate. Sodomy,
adultery, and homosexuality have no rational connection to procre-
ation or the maintenance of family life: These sexual activities
should therefore be subject to state regulation. 27 Nevertheless, the
Virginia sodomy statute probably cannot be applied constitution-
ally to married couples. In Lovisi v. Slayton12s the United States
121. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
122. Homosexual "marriage" is not a traditional form of marriage. Consequently, com-
ments concerning the protection of marriage do not extend to homosexual marriages.
123. 381 U.S. at 485.
124. In 1973 the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy encompassed a woman's
decision to have an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The Court noted, how-
ever, that the right was not unlimited; some state regulation in areas protected by the right
to privacy is appropriate when the state interests of health, medical standards, and prenatal
life become dominant. Id. at 154-55. Roe thus demonstrates that the right to privacy is not
all-encompassing.
The proposition that Griswold protected all decisions regarding childbearing was ex-
pressed most recently in 1977. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
125. 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 103-21.
127. This position ii defensible because Griswold protects decisions of childbearing and
no form of sodomy can lead to conception.
128. 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). The plaintiffs, a married
couple, solicited and obtained outside partners for their sex acts, which included sodomy.
The couple's teenage daughters were encouraged to watch and photograph sex acts per-
formed by their parents with strangers. The situation became known publicly when one of
the daughters distributed some of the photographs at school. The Court held that the mar-
ried couple, acting alone, was protected by the right of privacy. When a third person was
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that marital intima-
cies shared by couples alone in their bedrooms are protected by
the right of privacy.129
The more difficult question is whether the constitutional right to
privacy protects consensual sodomy between unmarried heterosex-
uals.13° In Eisenstadt v. Baird31 the United States Supreme Court
held that states could not deny contraceptives to unmarried per-
sons. The Court held that the Massachusetts law prohibiting the
sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it impermissi-
bly differentiated between married and unmarried persons.1 2 In
discussing Griswold, the Court in dicta stated:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right
to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the de-
cision whether to bear or beget a child. 33
The question posed in interpreting this dicta is whether a gen-
eral freedom "from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters fundamentally affecting a person" exists or whether the free-
dom is limited to the decision "whether to bear or beget a child."
The latter interpretation seems more correct.1T In Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International,35 a divided Supreme Court ex-
tended the right to contraceptives to minors. The Court noted that
although the outer limits of privacy were unclear,3 6 the right pro-
introduced, however, the couple waived their privacy right. Id. at 350-52.
129. Id. at 351. In an addendum to the Lovisi opinion, the Fourth Circuit noted the sum-
mary affirmance of Doe and reasoned that only heterosexual conduct was protected by the
right to privacy. Id. at 352; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
130. The question is confined to private as opposed to public heterosexual sodomy. See
supra note 11.
131. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
132. Id. at 454-55.
133. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
134. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
135. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
136. Id. at 684.
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tected certain fundamental liberties.' 37 These included marriage, 38
procreation,'39 contraception, 140 traditional family relationships,' 4 1
and child rearing and education. 142 The Court emphasized that
"the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very
heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.'. 43
Carey implies that Eisenstadt's constitutional protection from
unwarranted governmental intrusions into fundamental personal
decisions is limited to the decision to conceive and bear children.14 4
In other words, Eisenstadt and Carey only require that the states
not interfere with heterosexual couples' rights to procreation and
contraception. They do not suggest that sodomy statutes are inva-
lid. Carey footnotes did discuss briefly whether the states could
regulate consensual sexual activity in general but reached no defin-
itive answer.145 This Supreme Court silence, coupled with the nar-
row construction demanded of a nontextual right, suggests that
courts should hesitate to extend privacy protection to nonmarital
heterosexual sodomy. 46
Several alternative arguments remain. The first is that the right
to privacy extends to all consensual sexual activity.' 47 This argu-
ment is based partially on the Supreme Court decision in Stanley
v. Georgia.148 In Stanley police officers searched the defendant's
137. Id. at 684-85.
138. Id. at 685 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 11, 12 (1967)).
139. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1972)).
140. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 438 U.S. 48, 453-54 (1972)).
141. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 510 (1944)).
142. Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 570, 575 (1925)).
143. Id. at 685.
144. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a maxim of statutory interpretation meaning
that the "expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 512
(5th ed. 1979). Applied to Carey, the specific Court expression of each area protected by the
right of privacy excludes any other area from privacy protection. See 431 U.S. at 685.
145. 431 U.S. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17, 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
believed that the limit of privacy had been drawn short of the stipulated deviate sex acts of
Doe. Id. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
146. For example, the Fourth Circuit has expressed doubt that the right to privacy ex-
tends to nonmarital sodomy. In the addendum to Lovisi the court stated "the Supreme
Court necessarily confined the constitutionally protected right of privacy to heterosexual
conduct, probably even that only within the marital relationship." 539 F.2d at 352 (empha-
sis added).
147. See Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
148. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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home for evidence of alleged bookmaking activities and found ob-
scene films in the defendant's bedroom.149 A divided Court held
that the private possession of obscene material in the home was
not a crime.1 50 The Court reiterated the first amendment right to
receive information and ideas, holding that the individual's right to
read or to observe what he pleased was "fundamental to our
scheme of individual liberty." 151 The Court reasoned that the
Framers of the Constitution "conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized man. "152
The argument following from Stanley is that if a person may
view obscene films for sexual gratification in the home, then logi-
cally a person may pursue any form of sexual gratification within
the home.153 This interpretation is incorrect. Stanley was a first
amendment case and the "liberty" it enunciated was the liberty to
receive speech, not to engage in sex acts.M Further, the Constitu-
149. Id. at 558.
150. Id. at 568.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 564 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
153. The Supreme Court later limited the right to view obscenity to the home. Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). In Paris the Court held that a state can
prohibit the display of obscene films to "consenting adults" in a theatre. Id. at 68-69. The
Court believed that its function was not "to resolve empirical uncertainities underlying state
legislation, save in the exceptional case where the legislation plainly impinges upon rights
protected by the Constitution itself. .. Although there is no conclusive proof of a connec-
tion between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite
reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist. . . .[A] legislature [can]
legitimately act on such a conclusion to protect the 'social interest in order and morality.'"
Id. at 60-61 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). The Court added that
nothing in its decision intimated that there is any "fundamental" privacy right "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" to watch obscene movies in places of public accomodation.
Id. at 66. The idea that the Stanley privacy right to view pornography in the home could
move outside the home as a "zone of privacy" therefore was rejected. Id.
By analogy, a state legislature could find a connection between antisocial behavior and
sodomy and legitimately act on that conclusion to protect social order and morality. A "fun-
damental" privacy right likewise does not protect sodomy.
154. Another question is whether the Privacy Act of 1974 codified the right to privacy. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982). Section 2(a)(4) of that Act contains the congressional finding that the
"right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the
United States." The Act primarily safeguards individuals from the misuse of federal records
and grants individuals access to those records. It was not used substantively to support the
constitutional right to privacy in either Doe or Carey. Thus, the Act seemingly has not
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tion does not incorporate the proposition that conduct involving
only consenting adults always is beyond state regulation.155
The breadth of the right to privacy was questioned most re-
cently in Whalen v. Roe. 156 In Whalen, the Supreme Court held
that the right could not protect the identity of patients who re-
ceived certain types of drugs. 5 7 The Court raised the specter of
Lochner and pointed out that "state legislation which has some
effect on individual liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitu-
tional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in
part."' 158 A year later the Court let stand a lower court decision
that refused to extend the rights of privacy and equal protection to
prohibit employment discrimination based on adultery.159
Privacy Attacks by Homosexuals
The third major question under the privacy analysis is whether
the right to privacy protects consensual sodomy between homosex-
uals. This question is best approached tlirough an analysis of the
successful recent attacks on sodomy statutes by homosexuals. 60
codified or provided any expanded substantive constitutional right.
In his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952), Mr. Justice Jackson stated that Presidential power was at its maximum when used
pursuant to an express or implied congressional authorization. Id. at 635. When the Presi-
dent acts in the absence of a congressional grant or denial, he must rely on his independent
powers. Id. at 637. Finally, when the President acts incompatibly with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its nadir. Id.
By analogy, the Supreme Court's credibility when creating nontextual rights is maximized
when consistent with congressional will and is minimized when inconsistent with congres-
sional will. Despite arguments of judicial independence, the congressional failure to codify
the Griswold right to privacy leaves the Court standing alone. Further, congressional at-
tempts to repeal portions of the right to privacy indicate the Court's vulnerability when
using substantive due process. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 119, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S.J. Res.
130, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Helms Amendment); see also Dronenberg, 741 F.2d at
1396.
155. 413 U.S. at 68.
156. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
157. Id. at 597.
158. Id.
159. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 864 (1978); see also Johnson v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 498 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. Tex.
1980). But see supra note 68.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 82-95.
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Baker v. Wade
In 1976, Doe held that the right to privacy did not protect cer-
tain forms of sexual conduct, including homosexual sodomy.161 In
Baker v. Wade16 2 however, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas distinguished Doe as a summary affirm-
ance and held that Doe was no longer law under the "doctrinal
development" exception to summary affirmances.163 The court
cited the footnote discussion in Carey64 and the denial of certio-
rari to People v. Onofre"e5 as "doctrinal developments" in the right
to privacy that had invalidated Doe."' The court then construed
from Stanley that a right exists to engage in any form of sexual
gratification in the home.16 7 It then used the Eisenstadt principle
of nondistinguishment between married and unmarried persons to
bootstrap the original Stanley proposition into a general right to
engage in any form of sexual gratification with anyone in the
home."'
Baker is flawed for several reasons. First, a doctrinal develop-
ment is a significant change in the Supreme Court's treatment of
an issue.169 The doctrinal development exception reasonably can-
not be applied to Doe because the Supreme Court has not noted
probable jurisdiction or considered a sodomy case since Doe, and
neither the Carey footnote discussion nor the denial of certiorari to
Onofre constitutes a "change of law.1 70 For these reasons, Doe re-
161. 403 F. Supp. at 1202. In 1973 the Supreme Court upheld a Florida sodomy statute
against vagueness and retroactivity attacks. The Court did not address any other constitu-
tional issues but provided implied support to sodomy statutes. Wainwright v. Stone, 414
U.S. 21 (1973). Vagueness attacks on sodomy statutes generally have failed due to incorpo-
ration of state common law definitions. 414 U.S. at 22.
162. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
163. Id. at 1138. The doctrinal development exception to summary affirmances allows
lower courts to give a summary affirmance less precedential weight if it is inconsistent with
later doctrinal developments. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975). See generally
Annot., 45 L. ED. 2D 791, 803-04 (1976 & Supp. 1984).
164. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
165. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
166. 553 F. Supp. at 1138.
167. Id. at 1141.
168. Id.
169. See Annot., supra note 163, § 6, at 803-04.
170. Id.; see also Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1213-16 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
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mains valid and should have controlled Baker.
Second, the Stanley-Eisenstadt bootstrapping analysis reached
too far. Stanley was a first amendment case that, after Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slayton,' must be questioned if anyone outside the
home or the family is involved. When Eisenstadt is added, Stanley
could reach no further than a right of nonmarried couples to use
contraceptives in their home.17 2 If a broader reading is combined
with Carey, the Baker bootstrapping analysis would protect the
right to perform sodomy on minors in the home. That interpreta-
tion is inconsistent with recent decisions that protect children
from sexual abuse and pornography. 73
Hardwick v. Bowers
Most recently, in Hardwick v. Bowers, 4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Doe as
both a lack of standing case and a summary affirmance made inap-
plicable by the doctrinal developments exception. The court first
stated that because Doe was a summary affirmance, its holding
must be limited carefully. 7 5 Because the court believed the plain-
tiffs in Doe lacked standing, the court chose to believe that the
Supreme Court affirmed the Virginia statute on the ground that
the plantiffs lacked standing rather than on the ground that their
constitutional claims lacked merit. 7 6
The Eleventh Circuit was incorrect for several reasons. First, if
the Supreme Court had decided that the plaintiffs in Doe lacked
standing, the Court would not have had jurisdiction to decide the
case and would have dismissed their appeal rather than affirm the
judgment below. 17 7 Second, the jurisdictional statement in Doe
mentioned the substantive constitutional issues in the case, but did
171. 413 U.S. 49; see supra note 153.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 144-52.
173. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). A unanimous Court upheld a New
York ban on child pornography, even if not obscene. The Court noted that the prevention of
sexual exploitation and abuse of children were important government objectives that over-
rode the first amendment. Id. at 756-57.
174. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
175. Id. at 1207.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1214 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
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not mention the issue of standing. The district court in Doe also
did not mention standing. Because lower court interpretation of a
summary affirmance is limited to the jurisdictional statement and
because standing was not considered in the Doe statement, the
Eleventh Circuit was incorrect when it distinguished Doe as a lack
of standing case. 17s Third, the decision in Doe was a decision on
the merits that did not leave lower courts free to speculate whether
the decision was based on a lack of standing.1 9
The Eleventh Circuit also held that even if Doe was not a stand-
ing case, it had been overruled by the doctrinal developments ex-
ception to summary affirmances. 18 ° The court cited footnote five in
Carey 8" and the denial of certiorari to Uplinger82 as significant
subsequent developments in law that had overruled Doe.'s3 The
court was incorrect regarding Carey because the discussion be-
tween footnotes five and seventeen indicated not that the right to
privacy protected all private sexual conduct but that the right to
privacy did not extend as far as the plaintiffs in Carey re-
quested.18 4 The court was incorrect regarding Uplinger because a
denial of certiorari has no precedential value, even where briefs are
received and arguments are heard prior to the denial.8 5
After attempting to distinguish Doe, the Eleventh Circuit pro-
ceeded to the merits and held sodomy to be protected specifically
by a fundamental right to "quintessential privacy" and intimate
association grounded in both the ninth amendment and the notion
of fundamental fairness in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8' The court combined a uniquely expansive view of
Griswold and its progeny with Stanley's first amendment right to
speech in the home to create a new fundamental right to "quintes-
178. Id. at 1213-14.
179. Id. at 1213.
180. Id. at 1208.
181. See supra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
183. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1208-10.
184. Id. at 1214-15.
185. Id. at 1214-16. The Eleventh circuit also cannot rely on the equally divided vote in
Board of Educ. v. National Gay Task Force, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985), because affirmances by
an equally divided vote are entitled to no precedential value. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 191-92 (1972); Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 (1960).
186. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210-13.
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sential privacy". 187
Again, the Eleventh Circuit was wrong for several reasons. The
right to privacy has been limited to the realm of family, home, or
procreation and cannot be distorted to protect deviant sexual pref-
erences. 188 Second, the Supreme Court has not found a right to
"quintessential privacy" or sexual freedom and, with Doe remain-
ing the law, the Eleventh Circuit had no license to create such a
right.189
People v. Onofre
In People v. Onofre'90 the New York Court of Appeals also dis-
tinguished Doe as a case turning on lack of standing. Because a
summary affirmance confirms only the holding, not the judgment
of a lower court, the court in Onofre decided that the Supreme
Court allowed the decision to stand because the defendant did not
face actual charges, not because the right to privacy did not pro-
tect consensual sodomy.' 91 After dispensing with Doe, the court fo-
cused on the absence of physical harm in consensual sodomy rela-
tions and found no evil for the state to prevent and no public
interest to protect. 92 The court also distinguished private morality
from public morality. It held that the police power protected only
public morality. Because, according to the court, private morality
had no effect on general public morality, the police power could
not reach private morality. 93
In his dissent, Judge Gabrielli contended that the court had
eliminated the long-recognized state power to regulate the moral
conduct of its citizens and "to maintain a decent society.' 1 94 He
noted that the court had hoisted substantive due process, through
modern Lochnerization, to its former status as a vehicle for law-
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 115-59 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 230-37.
190. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
191. Id. at 493, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953-54.
192. Id. at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53.
193. Id. at 489-90, 415 N.E.2d at 941-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
194. Id. at 497, 415 N.E.2d at 945, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 956 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
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making by judicial fiat.'95 Further, Judge Gabrielli asserted that
the privacy cases must be interpreted narrowly, and that the Su-
preme Court had not created a generalized right of complete sexual
freedom. 196
Judge Gabrielli was correct. Doe cannot be dismissed as a stand-
ing case for reasons discussed earlier.19 7 In summarily affirming
Doe, therefore, the Supreme Court necessarily upheld both the
standing of the plaintiffs and the lower court's holding that the
right to privacy does not extend to consensual homosexual
relationships.
Second, the court in Onofre failed to recognize that private im-
morality is inseparable from public immorality. Consequently, ap-
plying the Onofre reasoning has led to absurd results. An excellent
example of the natural progression of the decision was the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Uplinger.'9 The
court struck down a New York statute ' that prohibited loitering
to solicit partners for deviant sexual conduct by reasoning that the
law punished anticipatory sodomy that Onofre now protected. 00
The facts paint a very different picture. One female defendant was
flagging down cars on a street corner while making loud and overt
offers to sell sexual favors. The primary male defendant asked peo-
ple on the street whether they would like to participate in deviate
sex acts.20' The heart of the holding seems to be that a right to
consensual sodomy would be of little value if one could not go out
on the street to solicit sex partners. 2  Uplinger demonstrates the
195. Id. at 503, 415 N.E.2d at 949, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 959-60.
196. Id. at 499, 415 N.E.2d at 947, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
197. See Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392; see also supra notes 177-79.
198. 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2332
(1984).
199. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(a)(3) (McKinney 1980) prohibited loitering "in a public
place for the purpose of engaging or soliciting another person to engage in deviate sexual
intercourse or other sexual behavior of a deviate nature."
200. 58 N.Y.2d at 938, 447 N.E.2d at 63, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
201. Id. at 942, 447 N.E.2d at 65, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
202. After initially granting certiorari in Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 64 (1984), the Supreme
Court decided, per curiam, that certiorari had been improvidently granted. 104 S. Ct. 2332
(1984). The Court considered that the New York Court of Appeals opinion in Uplinger was
"fairly subject to varying interpretations," leaving the precise constitutional issues unclear.
Id. at 2333. Further, meaningful evaluation of the Uplinger decision required consideration
of Onofre, a case not challenged by the petitioners. Id. at 2333-34. Chief Justice Burger,
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fallacy of arguing that private morality does not affect public
morality.
Commonwealth v. Bonadio
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Commonwealth v.
Bonadio20 3 as a police power question. The court found no public
interest and thus no justification for state interference with the on-
stage sexual exploits of the defendants.0 4 The court seemed to re-
quire actual physical harm before a legitimate state interest arose.
The individual's pursuit of her own "morality," here public sex
acts for money, was held more important than the state morality
condemning that activity.0 5
The Pennsylvania court made a number of errors in reaching its
decision. As noted by Justice Nix's dissent, Bonadio did not in-
volve private sodomy.20 6 The acts took place onstage before an au-
dience and were conducted for commercial gain. Paris Adult Thea-
tre I clarified that the Stanley protection of pornography does not
apply outside the home.207 The court in Bonadio, however, did not
mention or distinguish Paris Adult Theatre I. The court also ig-
nored the longstanding case law that allowed the state to legislate
morality, even without physical harm. Finally, the court did not
consider or distinguish Doe. Bonadio is a clear example of the dan-
gers of judicial Lochnerization. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
overrode the Pennsylvania legislature without even considering rel-
evant case law.
Dronenburg v. Zech
In Dronenburg, however, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the right to privacy did
Justice White, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor dissented. They believed that the
New York statute had been invalidated on federal constitutional grounds and that the mer-
its of the case were properly before the Court. Id. at 2335 (White, J., dissenting).
203. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
204. Id. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51-52; see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
205. Id. at 96, 415 A.2d at 50. The majority morality was expressed in the Pennsylvania
Deviate Sexual Intercourse Statute. See supra note 92.
206. 490 Pa. at 100, 415 A.2d at 52 (Nix, J., dissenting).
207. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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not extend to homosexual conduct.20 8 The court considered the
Baker position that Stanley and Eisenstadt created a general right
to engage in any form of sexual gratification in the home and con-
cluded that the right to privacy did not extend that far and cer-
tainly did not protect a right to homosexual conduct.20 9 The court
considered an argument similar to the Onofre position that the leg-
islature could not reach private morality and concluded that such
an argument was completely frivolous.21 0 The court concluded that
there was no constitutional right to engage in homosexual
conduct.21'
A critique of the above cases demonstrates that Doe remains
good law. Consequently, the right to privacy does not protect ho-
mosexual sodomy.212 No general right of sexual freedom has
emerged.21 ' Although debatable interpretations of Griswold and its
progeny protect marital sodomy and muddy the waters of
nonmarital sodomy, the Hardwick, Baker, and Onofre attempts to
protect homosexual sodomy are specious.
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment di-
rects that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike. ' 21 4 Legislatures may classify persons differently so long as
the classifications do not involve a "suspect class" or infringe a
"fundamental right. 21 5 In the absence of these exceptions, the
classification need bear only some fair relationship to a legitimate
state purpose.2 16 "The judiciary [will] not sit as a superlegislature
to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations ... 17
The first step in an equal protection analysis is to determine the
208. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
209. Id. at 1393-96.
210. Id. at 1397.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 1395-96.
213. Id. at 1391.
214. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
215. Id. at 216-17.
216. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1975).
217. Id.
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particular problem that a state regulation seeks to alleviate. In the
case of Virginia's sodomy statute, that problem is sexual conduct
that is likely to contribute to legislatively determined moral delin-
quency. 18 The state's concern is legitimate because it is well set-
tled that the police power may be exercised to preserve and protect
public morals.219 The police power can be used to preserve public
morality because government is public order and destroying public
order weakens government.220
The second step in an equal protection analysis is to determine
whether a suspect class has been singled out by the statute. In
Frontiero v. Richardson,221 the Supreme Court provided the
framework for determining a suspect class. In Frontiero, the Court
compared sex to the quintessential suspect class of race and con-
cluded that sex was an inherently suspect classification.2 2 The fac-
tors considered were whether there was historical stigmatization or
overuse of the classification with an implication of inferiority,223
whether the classification addressed a discrete and insular minor-
ity,224 and whether the classification was based on an immutable
characteristic.2
Traditionally, the courts have not considered homosexuals to be
a suspect class. 226 The Frontiero analysis supports this conclusion.
Homosexuals historically have been victimized by the heterosexual
majority. The long history of Anglo-American sodomy statutes
demonstrates that stigmization.227 The other two factors, however,
are not satisfied. Although homosexuals are a minority, they are
218. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
219. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); see also State v. Rhinehart, 70 Wash. 2d
649, 424 P.2d 906, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 832 (1967).
220. Cf. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684
(1959). New York banned the film "Lady Chatterley's Lover" because it depicted adultery
as a moral act. The Supreme Court reversed because the statute impinged on the textually
enumerated freedom of speech, not because the state lacked power to regulate moral con-
duct. Id.
221. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
222. Id. at 688. Sex no longer is considered a suspect classification. See Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Fronterio is used only for its suspect-class analysis.
223. 411 U.S. at 684-87.
224. Id. at 686 n.17; see also Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
225. 411 U.S. at 686.
226. See Doe, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
227. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
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not a "discrete or insular" minority. Homosexuals are not identi-
fied easily by an immutable characteristic, like race or sex, and so-
ciety is not divided easily along heterosexual-homosexual lines. Ap-
pearance alone gives no indication of a person's sexual preference.
Sexual preference also arguably is not an immutable characteristic,
like race or sex. Because homosexuals fail to meet the last two fac-
tors, they are not a suspect class.
Another characteristic defining a suspect class is whether the
particular group has been denied participation in the political pro-
cess. Recent decisions that protect homosexual speech and associa-
tion have ensured access to the media.228 The decriminalization of
consensual sodomy by twenty-two states229 reflects the political
participation and power of homosexuals. Homosexuals therefore do
not need the special protection afforded suspect classes.
The third step in equal protection analysis is to determine
whether unnatural sexual activity is a fundamental right.230 Thus
far, the recognized fundamental rights have been limited to vot-
ing,23 1 appeal, 23 2 counsel,23 3 travel,234 association,23 and privacy.2 6
By the principle expressio unis, no fundamental right to sodomy
exists.23 7
Finally, the fourth step is to determine whether the statute ra-
tionally supports a legitimate state purpose. In the absence of a
suspect class or a fundamental right, rational basis scrutiny is the
applicable standard of judicial review. In this instance, if any per-
sons decline to engage in the prohibited sexual conduct because of
the sodomy statute, the legitimate goal of enhancing general mo-
rality will be achieved. Although the precise effect of the statutes is
not quantifiable, they may inhibit persons inclined toward homo-
228. See Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977).
229. See supra note 49.
230. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982) (education not a fundamen-
tal right).
231. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
232. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
233. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
234. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
235. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
236. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
237. See supra note 144 and accompanying text; see also Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397.
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sexuality from engaging in sodomy.38 The statutes, therefore, ra-
tionally serve the states' purpose."'
The courts that have invalidated state sodomy statutes on equal
protection grounds have failed to apply this analysis properly. The
court in Baker struck down the Texas sodomy statutes both be-
cause it could find no legitimate state interest behind the statute2 40
and because the heterosexual-homosexual distinction was imper-
missible.241 The court was incorrect, however, on both points. First,
the "public distaste" for homosexual sodomy that the court found
not to be a legitimate state interest 242 is a legitimate interest if it
represents the expression of the general public morality. Further,
most cases have held that the regulation of morals is within the
police power.
Second, the heterosexual-homosexual distinction should have
passed rational basis scrutiny. Because sodomy is the only form of
sexual expression available to homosexuals, they necessarily are
more likely to perform sodomy than heterosexuals. So long as
homosexuals are more likely to engage in prohibited conduct, a
statute applied'only to them is rationally related to the legitimate
state goal of preventing, or at least reducing, sodomy. Admittedly
the Texas statute and all sodomy statutes have the effect of dis-
criminating against homosexuals by denying them their only sexual
outlet while not so denying heterosexuals. In Washington v. Da-
vis,14 however, the Supreme Court held that disproportionate im-
pact alone is insufficient to render a statute constitutionally defec-
tive. Some discriminatory intent must exist.244
The court in Onofre, discovered a different equal protection de-
fect, finding that the New York statute distinguished impermissi-
238. See R. HOOK, THE CONsTrrUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY: SODOMY LAWS 2 (1981).
239. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Sodomy stat-
utes might survive even strict scrutiny as a means to inhibit the spread of Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency syndrome. See supra note 41; infra text accompanying note 261.
240. 553 F. Supp. at 1143-44.
241. Id. at 1144.
242. Id. at 1143-44.
243. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia police de-
partment's requirement for all applicants to pass Federal Test 21 despite the fact that a
disproportionate number of blacks failed the test. Effect, by itself, is not a constitutional
violation. See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
244. 426 U.S. at 246.
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bly between married and unmarried persons.245 The court appar-
ently held the view that Griswold protects all sexual activity
between married persons24' and that Eisenstadt extended that
range of sexual freedom to all persons, married or unmarried. Con-
sequently, the court believed that no distinction could be drawn
between married and unmarried persons without a rational justifi-
cation.2 47 The Pennsylvania court in Bonadio engaged in similar
reasoning.-
48
This married-unmarried distinction, like the "pure" heterosex-
ual-homosexual distinction, should not make sodomy statutes de-
fective. Because homosexual couples by definition are unmarried,
and homosexuals are more likely to engage in sodomy, a statute
applied only to unmarried couples rationally furthers the legiti-
mate state interest in preventing sodomy.
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit circumvented the entire analysis by creating a funda-
mental right to quintessential privacy and intimate association.249
The court then remanded the case to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia for strict scrutiny of the
statute.250 The Eleventh Circuit was incorrect because the Su-
preme Court has never held a fundamental right to sodomy to ex-
ist and, with Doe remaining the law, the Eleventh Circuit did not
have the power to create such a fundamental right.5 1
Baker, Onofre, and Bonadio all demonstrate that the courts
which invalidate sodomy statutes do so by distorting the equal
protection analysis. In the absence of a suspect class or fundamen-
tal right, they are in reality applying a strict scrutiny analysis
rather than the proper rational basis scrutiny. Hardwick went one
step further and created a new fundamental right.2  These courts
are ignoring totally the state's long-recognized ability to define and
to protect morality. As a result, the decisions reached by these
245. 51 N.Y.2d at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
246. See Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968).
247. 51 N.Y.2d at 491-92, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
248. 490 Pa. at 98-99, 415 A.2d at 51.
249. See supra notes 186-87.
250. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1213.
251. See supra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 186-88.
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courts conflict with a proper equal protection analysis of the sod-
omy statutes.2 53
THE LEGISLATIVE DECISION
After determining that the states constitutionally may criminal-
ize consensual homosexual sodomy, the question remains whether,
as a matter of policy, the states should criminalize such sodomy.
Several important factors argue for decriminalization. Philosoph-
ically, John Stuart Mill argues that "[t]he only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised . . . is to prevent harm to
others. ' 254 This argument commonly is used to prevent any crimi-
nal enforcement of private, consensual, but "immoral," acts.255
Second, as a practical matter, the sodomy statutes virtually are un-
enforceable and any attempted enforcement will be expensive.2 56
In addition, crimes more important than sodomy face the state po-
lice forces.257 Third, the thought of police peeking in windows or
searching bedrooms for evidence of sodomy258 is distasteful even in
the absence of a specific constitutional right to privacy. Finally, an
unenforced law often is disregarded by the public. The existence of
such a law encourages public disdain for other, more important
laws, and may defeat the preservation of order sought by the
forced imposition of morality.
Alternatively, sodomy statutes are the type of laws that, even if
largely unenforceable, may serve valuable societal interests. First,
some forms of consensual sodomy threaten the traditional family
unit and consequently threaten society.259 Second, no private act is
a true self-regarding act.260 All private, consensual acts necessarily
affect other members of society, even if tangentially. Third, en-
253. See supra text accompanying notes 214-53.
254. See supra note 95.
255. See H. HART, LAW, LmERwY AND MORALITY (1962); see also R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 240-58 (1978). Significant support exists in the academic legal community
for the decriminalization of private consensual sodomy. See L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, § 15-13 (1978); see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.2 (1980).
256. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2, at 370 (1980).'
257. Id.
258. Fourth amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure nullify the
danger of this factor.
259. See P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 24-25 (1968).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 109 & 198-202.
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forcement of sodomy statutes may play a crucial role in the con-
tainment and eradication of Acquired Immunodeficiency syn-
drome. 2 1 Fourth, sodomy statutes play an important role as
ancillary charges in sexual assault, rape, or child abuse cases. Sod-
omy statutes also provide a lesser included offense in forcible or
public sodomy cases. Fifth, decriminalization of sodomy without
decriminalization of other "victimless" moral crimes like drug use,
bestiality, and necrophilia is logically inconsistent. Sixth, govern-
ment has an obligation to provide social norms for its citizens and
government should provide examples of acceptable and unaccept-
able conduct. Even if disobeyed by a vocal minority, these laws
provide necessary moral guidance to the bulk of society.
Disregard of the law, moreover, does not prevent sodomy stat-
utes from having an effect on homosexuals. First, laws prohibiting
sodomy apparently do dissuade some persons from homosexual ac-
tivity.26 2 Second, the sodomy laws have a larger opportunity for en-
forcement against homosexuals because people are more likely to
report homosexual misconduct.26 3 Third, the laws indirectly sup-
port societal discouragement of homosexuality. 2 4 For these rea-
sons, a state legislature rationally could continue the criminaliza-
tion of homosexual sodomy.
CONCLUSION
Attempts to expand the right to privacy to protect private con-
sensual sodomy should fail. The right to privacy is not absolute
and never was intended to protect sodomy. Because the Supreme
Court created the right to privacy by judicial Lochnerization, the
right must be defined narrowly.265 The equal protection attacks on
sodomy statutes are inapposite because homosexuals are not a sus-
pect class, because no fundamental right to sodomy exists, and be-
cause the sodomy statutes rationally support a legitimate state
purpose. For these reasons, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney re-
mains the proper expression of the law.
261. See supra notes 41 & 239.
262. See HooK, supra note 238, at 2.
263. Id. at 3 (discussing the prevalence of blackmail against homosexuals).
264. Id; see also Annot., 42 A.LR. FED. 189 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 121 & 196.
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The larger issue is which branch of government should decide
moral questions for our society. The state legislatures traditionally
made all decisions concerning sexual morality until Griswold. The
state legislatures should be allowed to continue to resolve these
questions. Decisions regarding morality require the balancing of
broad policy considerations. Legislatures are better suited for these
decisions. Thus, judicial interference should be minimized.
Finally, granting that the states have the power to criminalize
consensual sodomy, they should balance carefully the efficacy of a
sodomy statute with the practicalities and problems of its enforce-
ment. Twenty-two states have reacted to these factors by
decriminalizing consensual sodomy.266 Conversely, if a legislature
determines that the prohibition of consensual sodomy will enhance
general morality, it should be free to make that choice.
ARTHUR E. BROOKS
266. See supra note 49.
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